Introduction

Sudan has been embroiled in many armed conflicts. The latest began in earnest in February 2003 in the western region of Darfur. Two prior civil wars had roots in the south of the country, specifically the area called Southern Sudan which consists of the three provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria.

The conflicts in Sudan can broadly be understood as an outcome of unequal economic and power relations between the centre and the peripheries. Other factors such as land access and ownership, perceived ethnic divisions and the involvement of neighbouring countries are also significant.

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in Naivasha, Kenya, officially ended the war between the North and the South. It provides either for unification or for the secession of the South from the rest of country. It remains to be seen whether either of these options can bring a lasting peace; the implementation of the CPA has been delayed and there are a number of outstanding issues unresolved by the agreement.

The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, forced through under heavy international pressure, has not brought a resolution to the crisis or an end to the fighting. It was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006 by the Government of Sudan and one of the three rebel factions. Following the signing there were widespread demonstrations against the agreement in the displaced persons’ camps, the rebel factions fragmented, and the fighting continued. The UN and the African Union are currently coordinating a joint mediation strategy.

▲Top▲

Sudan’s colonial past

The first civil war began in 1955 just before the state gained independence in 1956. Conflict began during the process leading up to independence from the Anglo-British Condominium, which had ruled Sudan as a colony since 1898. The road to independence was rocky. The southern part of the country had historically been separate from the north prior to the 1860s. Attempts to pacify the south and set up an overall administration during the later part of the Turco-Egyptian period (1821 – 1885) and the early part of the Mahdiyya (1885 – 1898) met with little success. A southern administration was successfully established during the Anglo-Egyptian period (1898 – 1955), but this was separate from the government in the north.

Beginning in 1948 the two administrative governments were joined together but numerous demands from southern politicians were not met. As the situation deteriorated these demands escalated: from calls for education and development in the south, to federal status for the south, to self-determination and separation.

▲Top▲

First civil war

The decision to unify the armies in the north and south into one unit eventually led to the first civil war when a battalion of soldiers from the Equatoria Defence Force in Torit resisted orders to transfer to the north. This mutiny by a group of soldiers over a very local reason, namely the objection of one barrack to transfer, did not begin the war but rather resulted in the emergence of various armed bands living in the ‘bush’ and launching attacks on the new state’s armed forces. These bands were neither cohesive nor coordinated and lacked not only a common agenda but also a political goal.

The articulation of the political grievances of the southern peoples came later in 1963 when the southern political parties formulated their demands. It took even longer for the various armed bands to be united under one leadership. In 1970, Joseph Lagu managed to unite the various groups under the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).

▲Top▲

Inter-war grievances

In 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) was signed between the SSLM and the government-of-the-day. The AAA unified the three southern provinces into one region and granted the South regional autonomy with its own High Executive Council (HEC) and Regional Assembly. The AAA gave the President of the Republic extensive powers including veto power over bills emerging from the Regional Assembly and influence in impeaching the President of the Southern Region or members of the HEC. It also made the HEC responsible to the President. These presidential powers eventually resulted in significant personal interference by Nimeri into the affairs of the southern regional government.

A number of other issues also plagued relations between the southern regional government and the central government. These included the central government hindering development projects in the south, whereby money for development was not forthcoming; an attempt to redraw the boundaries of the south and transfer southern areas with rich resources to the north; an attempt to build an oil refinery in the north when oil was extracted from the south; and the construction of the Jonglei Canal in the south without simultaneous progress in development projects to raise the socio-economic standard of the southern people in that region.

These issues led to a breakdown in the mutual trust between southern and northern Sudanese that the AAA had fostered. Southerners began to suspect the intentions of the government and northerners began to suspect the intentions of the south to use the regional autonomy as a prelude to secession. This growing mistrust and the weaknesses in the AAA eventually led to its abrogation by President Nimeri, even though he had originally been one of its principal signatories and proponents.

▲Top▲

Second civil war

Another order to transfer southern battalions to the north came in the middle of this environment, which was characterised by suspicion and disaffection from interference in southern regional politics. Thus, in May 1983, in a situation similar to that in 1955, the 105th battalion in Bor rejected transfer orders and mutinied. Other battalions in Pibor and Pochalla joined the mutiny along with many southerners who fled to Ethiopia to join the new rebellion. The situation was made worse by the re-division of the south in June into three regions in contravention of the AAA and the imposition of Islamic Sharia law in September.

This time it only took a couple of months for the mutineers to articulate their political grievances and unite as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The SPLM was established in July 1983 with the stated aim of creating a New Sudan of equality and economic and social justice. The movement’s agenda was not just to fight for the south but also for national restructuring of the political, economic and social basis of the state. Hence, it called for distribution of resources and power among all the varied groups in Sudan to redress the traditional ‘marginalisation’ of ‘peripheral regions’. This second civil war continued until January of 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the government and the SPLM.

▲Top▲

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The process leading to the signing of the CPA lasted for two and a half years of continuous negotiations over a number of issues. The first successes came with the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July 2002. This agreement granted the right of self-determination to the south with the options of unity with the north or secession. The protocol also established a decentralised system of government for the whole country with a national government made up of both southern and northern groups. This success was followed over the course of the next two years by the Security Arrangement Agreement, the Wealth-Sharing Agreement, the Power-Sharing Protocol, the Abyei Protocol, the Two Areas Protocol, and finally the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005.

▲Top▲

Implementation and shortcomings of the CPA

The CPA has been criticised for creating an exclusive ‘diarchy’ between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM, at the expense of other political parties and movements in the country. Implementation of the CPA has been slow. In 2006 the SPLM accused the NCP of violating, ignoring and undermining its commitments under the agreement. In April 2007 the NCP offered to renew its efforts to implement some elements of the CPA under the condition that the SPLM would join it in an electoral partnership.

Numerous shortcomings remain apparent to this day. The provisions of the CPA on the national reform of the civil service and fiscal transparency have yet to be effectively implemented. The border between the north and the south has yet to be finally demarcated. The 9th July deadline for the redeployment of all Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) troops from the South has not been met in full. Meanwhile, the SPLM Government of Southern Sudan faces instability due to financial constraints and delays in security sector reform.

Other ongoing and potential conflicts have not been resolved by the CPA. There have been delays in the implementation of the October 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, and there is rising disaffection in Northern Sudan relating to government dam-building projects. The war in Darfur continues.

▲Top▲

Darfur Crisis

A combination of economic underdevelopment, political marginalization, environmental degradation, local conflicts over land access and ownership, ethnic identities, and the militarisation of the region by the Sudanese government and neighbouring countries have all fed into the conflict in Darfur.

Famine struck Darfur in 1984-5. This, along with a lack of investment in the region and its increasing militarisation, contributed to the escalation of land-related conflict between predominantly ‘Arab’ herders and predominantly ‘African’ farmers. The region was used as a military ‘launching pad’ by Colonel Gaddafi of Libya in his war against Chad throughout the 1980s. Gaddafi also armed Murahleen ‘Arab’ militia in the region in the late 1980s, first with the purpose of attacking Dinka civilians in the South, and second with the intention of terrorizing the local ‘black’ population into accepting the proposed annexation of Darfur into Libya. (Both Eritrea and Chad have helped to arm Rebel movements in Darfur since 2005.) The Chad/Libyan war crossed the border into Darfur in the late 1980s.

In March 2003 the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began fighting the Sudanese Government. They attacked the Al Fashir airport in northern Darfur in April 2003.

The government’s response to the insurgency was to support proxy militias known as the Janjaweed (who had derived from the Murahleen), who attacked and plundered villages, killing and forcibly displacing the population. Estimates of the number of people displaced as a result of the violence regularly exceed 2 million, estimates of the number killed vary significantly but are in the hundreds of thousands.

▲Top▲

Darfur Peace Agreement

Following a series of negotiations hosted by the African Union in Abuja, Nigeria, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006 by the Government of Sudan and Minni Minnawi, leader of one of the two factions of the SLA. The agreement did not bring an end to the conflict.

The process which led to the DPA was characterised by a lack of negotiation between the parties, who were unrepresentative of all the Darfurian constituencies, in particular the Arab groups. Incoherence and divisions between the rebel movements, and asymmetries of power between the rebels and the government helped to stall the negotiations.

Unsubstantiated threats to cut funding for the process and impose sanctions on the participants were made by the international community along with the regular imposition of deadlines which were never met. This served to dent the credibility of the process. The imposition of regularly changing deadlines also prevented the planning of a coherent negotiating strategy and the mediators ended up drafting the agreement themselves. International pressure swayed Minni Minnawi to sign the DPA but the JEM and the other SLA faction refused to sign.

News of the signing of the DPA was met by demonstrations in the displaced camps, splits between the rebel groups and renewed fighting. The government used ‘implementation’ of the DPA as justification for further counter insurgency offensives. Accordingly, the DPA and the African Union are viewed with suspicion and hostility by much of the population and members of the non-signatory movements in Darfur.

A new mediation process is currently being led jointly by the UN and the African Union, who appear to be attempting to monopolise control of peace-building in the area. It is recognised that the new process must be more inclusive than that at Abuja. A central stated task is to unify the plethora of rebel movements in Darfur into one block so that negotiations can proceed with the Government. This is an area of contestation between the movements as it will essentially define who is given a mandate to represent Darfur.

Darfurian civil society movements are slowly gaining access to training and financial resources to enhance their capacity for, and involvement in, local peace-building initiatives. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, established under the DPA, is beginning to be used as a platform for consultations between civil society groups of different affiliations in the region.

by Peace Direct’s Sudan Conflict Expert

▲Top▲

Latest Update from CrisisWatch (September 2007)

Composition of 26,000-strong UN/AU force (UNAMID), authorised 31 July, debated; after meeting with President Bashir, AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare said non-Africans not required. U.S. Special Envoy Natsios expressed doubts over AU troop skill-level. 12 rebel groups attended 3-6 August Arusha talks with AU/UN mediators. Most significant absence was SLM faction leader Abdul Wahid. Though full rebel reunification not achieved, attendees reached “common platform” for final peace talks with government; mediators hoping for talks October. SPLM proposed 50/50 revenue sharing with NCP in oil-rich Abyei as interim measure; NCP rejected.

Fighting between rival Arab tribes in Darfur continued: Rizeigat and Tarjum signed truce 11 August after clashes killed 140. Amnesty International reported 23 August Sudanese government deploying weapons to Darfur in defiance of arms embargo. UN human rights office 21 August accused government-allied forces of mass abduction and rape in South Darfur December. Khartoum expelled top Canadian and EU diplomats for “meddling in its affairs”, director of CARE for “espionage”. EU envoy returned following “apology”. UN Sec. Gen. to travel to region early September.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

▲Top▲

Resources, Links and References

Insight on Conflict is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

Accord Sudan Project - Publication on peacebuilding in Sudan.

Africa Action - Reports and analysis of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region.

Afrol News Sudan - News, analysis, and reports on a variety of Sudanese issues.

AllAfrica.com Sudan - Indexes news articles from a range of sources, available in English and French.

Amnesty International - Sudan - Reports and documents on humanitarian issues in Sudan.

CARE - Country profile and projects run by CARE in Sudan.

Columbia University Libraries - African Studies - Extensive list of websites and documents relating to politics, human rights, and military and foreign policy in Sudan.

Concern - Country profile, news, and stories from Sudan.

Conciliation Resources - Essays on conflict in Sudan and other areas.

Crimes of War Project - An overview and insight into the wider implications of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region.

Crisis States Research Centre - A series of working papers on Darfur and other conflict areas.

Darfur Consortium - An African and international civil society action for Darfur, offering news articles on and background to the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region.

DarfurInformation.com - A comprehensive overview and history of the crisis in Sudan’s Darfur Region.

Ethnologue - A guide to the languages and ethicities of Sudan.

European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (ESPAC) - Links to publications on a variety of issues relating to the Sudanese conflict.

Eyes on Darfur - Amnesty USA’s multimedia mashup on Darfur.

Human Rights Watch - Articles and publications relating to human rights in Sudan.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center - Comprehensive overview of the Sudanese conflict, including the latest figures on IDP’s.

International Crisis Group - A comprehensive resource for information on Sudanese conflict.

Justice Africa - Contains articles relating to the Sudanese conflict, plus details of Justice Africa’s human rights projects in Sudan.

Medicines sans Frontieres - Articles, photographs, and videos relating to health and humanitarian issues in Sudan.

ReliefWeb - A leading on-line gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters.

Sudan Human Rights Organisation - Reports and articles on the conflict in Sudan.

Sudan Open Archive - Provides free digital access to contemporary and historical knowledge about Sudan

Sudan.net - Latest news and commentary on Sudan in English and Arabic.

Sudan Tribune - News site about Sudan: wires, featured articles, analysis, comment, press releases, and reports.

Sudan Vision - Independent daily news service, with articles on a variety of Sudanese issues.

UNIFEM - Overview and documents relating to the Sudanese conflict, with particular emphasis on the impact of the conflict on women.

University of Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Detailed overview and commentary on Sudanese conflict.

USAID - Country profile, updates, and projects relating to Sudanese development.

▲Top▲

Share This

Overview

VKBIK is a branch of an international association called the Congress of Intellectual Bosniaks. Their activities are spread across various levels and they are working in all areas cultural, intellectual, scientific etc. For example, the Bosnian branch issues a scientific and cultural magazine called Krug 99 each month, the branch in Austria organises the Sarajevo philharmonic concerts, and last month the Swiss branch organised a humanitarian auction for a hostel in Sarajevo, which raised 1.2 million euros.

VKBIK breaks down borders between groups and builds better relationships, which in turn builds peace. The organisation was founded with the aim of:

• Organise intellectual Bosnians from the territory of Kosovo to help develop the culture and science of this region;
• Protecting and preserving the cultural heritage of Kosovo Bosniaks in this region;
• Cooperating with all creative and positive organisations in this region in order to establish a better and more positive society;
• Offering professional help and cooperation for the economic development of Kosovo;
• Creation and implemention activities aimed at establishing better human relationships between the people of Kosovo; and
• Creation of an organisation that cooperates with intellectual people from Bosnia Herzegovina and other ex-Yugoslav republics on the basis of scientific development.

What Services are Provided?

Training in various areas, counselling, organisational services, seminars and similar.

Geographical Area of Operation

The activities and work of VKBIK are mostly based in Kosovo but we are also involved in projects in Bosnia and Serbia.

Funding Resources

• United States Agency for International Development (USAID);
• European Union (EU);
• Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA);
• Foundation for Democratic Initiatives (FDI);
• Kosovo Citizen Society Foundation (KCSF); and
• German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

What Further Information would you like?

All information that would help us find donors and partners who are ready and willing to work or sponsor projects and activities like peace-building.

What New Contacts would you like to make?

All organisations and foundations that are interested in creating mutually beneficial and common projects that would help and enable Kosovo to develop positively in all its areas.

Associated Organisations

• NGO Association of Modern Initiatives;
• NGO Voice, Centre for Regionalism;
• NGO Mother Teresa; and many others.

Share This

Overview

INSEC is a leading human rights organisation based in Kathmandu. It has district representatives in all 75 districts and is known for collecting and releasing information on civil and political rights for national and international media. It has been implementing human rights and peace programmes at the national and local level.

INSEC mainly works in the following fields:

• Human resource development on human rights and conflict transformation;
• Formation of victims’ group at the local level for peace-building (women, youth, the elderly and children);
• Empowerment for disadvantaged people through awareness raising and capacity building;
• Conflict mediation, campaigning and advocacy for repairing and rehabilitation;
• Lobbying and advocacy through interaction and meeting with stakeholders for peace and development;
• Emergency rescue and relief to the conflict victims;
• Documentation, publication and dissemination of education materials on human rights, peace and conflict transformation;
• Facilitation and coordination for rehabilitation and reconstruction; and
• Documentation of human rights violations and other violations in connection with the armed conflict.

The organisation has been putting pressure on both conflicting parties to accept peaceful means for conflict transformation through its above works.

INSEC is proud of its lobbying and advocacy results with the conflicting parties in Nepal and of its training of the security forces, which mainly focused on human rights, international humanitarian law, and peace and conflict transformation. The organisation has realised that human rights violations have increased daily due to the conflict and should be minimised. It has been raising awareness of this with both the conflict parties through training, lobbying and advocacy. The organisation has yet to evaluate its programmes.

What Services Are Provided?

• Advocacy;
• Lobbying;
• Training on conflict transformation and peace-building; and
• Documentation for human rights violations in connection with the Maoist war.

Geographical Area of Operation

Nationwide.

Funding Resources

• United Nations Development Programme - Support for Peace and Development Initiatives;
• Danish International Development Agency;
• Canadian Cooperation Office; and
• European Community (for peace programmes).

What Further Information Would You Like?

Human rights and peace-building information about organisations worldwide.

What New Contacts Would You Like To Make?

People and organisations working for human rights and democracy in Nepal.

Associated Organisations

INSEC is affiliated with 45 Nepali human rights organizations at the district level:

• Human Rights Consciousness & Development Centre (HUCODEC), Phidim- Panthar 024-20245/20248;
• People Awareness Campaign (PAC), Myanglung-Terhathum 026-460267;
• Human Rights Social Awareness & Development Centre(HUSADEC), Dhankuta-7, Dhankuta 026-20606;
• Social Awareness, Human Rights & Development Centre(ASAHURD), Bhojpur-6, Bhojpur 029-20181;
• Human Rights, Environment & Development Centre (HURENDEC), Gaighat-4, Udayapur 035-20208/20157;
• Forum for Human Rights & Environment (FOHREN), Biratnagar-6, Morang 021-27053;
• Human Rights & Social Service Centre (HUSEC), Rajbiraj-4, Saptari 031-20349/21172;
• Nepal Welfare Society (NWS), Lahan , Siraha 033-60576;
• Human Rights, Environment and Development Centre (HURED), Birtamod , Jhapa 023-40440;
• Human Rights Forum (HURF), Ilam-1, Ilam 027-20800;
• Information Centre for Social Awareness (SICA), Inaruwa, Sunsari 025-60738;
• Human Rights Awareness & Development Centre (HURADEVC), Charikot, Dolakha 049-20240;
• Human Rights & Environmental Education (HUREC), Banepa-10, Kavre 011-63096;
• Centre for Human Rights & Social Awareness (CENTHUR), Bidhur-4, Nuwakot 010-60261;
• The Dynamic Rural Rising Group (DRIG), Chautara –8, Sindhulpalchok 011-20068;
• Human Rights Enlightenment Centre (HREC), Kalaiya-5, Bara 053-50604;
• Human Rights Conscious Centre (HRCC), Gaur-8, Rautahat 055-29526;
• Society Upliftment Centre (SUC), Janakpur-9, Dhanusa 041-23315;
• Rural Development Centre (RDO), Malangwa, Sarlahi 046-20210;
• Human Rights Education & Awareness Centre (HURENCE), Kamalamai-6, Sindhuli 047-20259;
• Women Development Centre, Khareini-4 Parsa, Chitwan 056-82012;
• Human Rights and Social Service Centre (HUSEC), Dhunche, Rasuwa 010-69282;
• Resunga Human Rights Awareness Organisation (RERE), Tamghas, Gulmi 079-20222;
• Society for Protection of Human Rights & Rural Environment (SOPHRE), Beshisahar-9, Lamjung 066-20161/20125;
• Prakas Awareness Group (PRAG), Sadhikharka-6, Arghakhanchi 077-20181/20222;
• Human Rights Education & Development Centre (HURED), PutaliBazar-9, Syngja 063-20128;
• Rural Strengthening Centre, Haramtari - Gorkha 064-20126;
• Forum for Social Awareness and Development (FOSAD), Butwal-06. Rupendehi 071-044384;
• Human Rights & Legal Education Service Centre (HURLESC), Kapilbastu- 4. Kapilbastu 078-60172;
• Nepal United Village Development Centre, Byass-10, Tanahu 065-60315;
• Women Service Centre, Pokhara, Kaski 061-25906;
• Peoples’ Rights and Environment Society, Kushma, Parwat 067-20112;
• Human Rights Awareness Centre (HAC), Sejwaltakura-, Salyan 088-29078;
• Human Rights & Environment Concern Centre (HUREC), Gulariya, Bardiya 084-20136;
• Green Peace Movement (GPM), Nepalganj, Banke 081-40211;
• Human Rights Consciousness Forum (HRCF), Ghorahi, Dang 082-60877;
• Protection of Human Rights and Legal Service Centre (PHLRCS) Khalanga, Rukum;
• Human Rights Awareness Centre (HURAC), Liwang, Rolpa;
• Human Rights Awareness Movement Centre (HURAMOC), Khalanga. Dedeldhura 096-20147;
• Human Rights & People Service Centre (HURPEC), Silgadi, Doti 094-20158;
• Api Community Development Centre (ACDC), Khalanga-5, Darchula 093-20193/20237;
• Human Rights Awareness & Social Development Centre(HURASDEC), Tikapur-9, Kailai 091-23348;
• Human Rights and Environmental Preservation Centre (HUPEC), Mahendranagr, Kanchanpur 099-22432;
• Human Rights & Social Service Centre (HUSEC), Gothalapani, Beitadi; and
• Human Rights & Social Development Project (HRSDP), Bayalpata, Accham.

INSEC is also affiliated with the following international organisations: World Organisation against Torture, Forum Asia, Asia Election Observation, and South Asian Forum for Human Rights.

Share This

Description

This initiative seeks to empower local communities for mobilising in the peace-building process at the local level. The main thematic areas of the initiative are community empowerment, education, livelihood, primary health, and infrastructure development. Regarding the current peace process the initiative has focused on community empowerment for conflict transformation and peace-building. This initiative upholds that for the existence of a peaceful society, human rights and international humanitarian law must be respected. Rebuilding infrastructure that has been destroyed in conflict and empowering people through education are other key components of peace-building that this initiative supports.

Aims / Objectives

• To develop confidence building measures for conflict mitigation and to improve the socio-economic condition of the vulnerable population;
• To enhance the confidence and capabilities of local people for conflict mitigation and peace-building;
• To increase the availability of basic services and livelihood opportunities; and
• To more generally support the vulnerable and conflict-affected people in the community.

How it is Articulated

• Selection and recruitment of local facilitators;
• Selection of participants and CBOs;
• Training (human rights/international humanitarian law, conflict mitigation, conflict transformation and peace-building, leadership and institutional development, income generation);
• First aid training;
• Advocacy and lobbying for smooth delivery of medicine and health services;
• Skill development training (training on management of production, marketing and coordination with financial institutions for the provision of loans to CBOs for agricultural works); and
• Interaction and meetings at the village and district level.

Achievements / Learning Points

The initiative ‘Conflict Mitigation through Empowerment of Local Communities’ began in January 2006 and will run until December 2007. INSEC has noticed during this period that the above-mentioned goals have gradually been realised through different channels such as programme reports, evaluative survey, formal and informal sharing etc. It will have the following achievements by the end of the projects:

• Beneficiaries will be able to raise collective voices for minimising the effects of violent conflict;
• Identified basic needs of the vulnerable population will have been fulfilled;
• At least 123 CBOs and 300 individuals involved in conflict mediation at local level will have received training;
• About 5000 grassroots people will be newly aware of human rights/international humanitarian law and peace-building issues and will continue to pressurise concerned parties to follow respected norms and principles;
• Average income of the local community people will have increased by 15% in the project areas following skill development training;
• Increase in health care services received by local people; and
• At least one development infrastructure project (e.g. water irrigation, school) per village council will have been built or repaired and be functional.

Geographical Area of Operation

Six districts: Bardiya, Banke, Dang, Pyuthan, Jarjarkot and Surkhet of the mid-western region of Nepal

Funding Resources

European Union (EU)

Share This

Introduction

The war in Kosovo (Albanian: Kosova, Serbian: Kosovo-Metohija) in 1998-99 followed almost a decade of Serbian repression and predominantly non-violent resistance from the majority Albanian population. Since then, the former-Yugoslav province has been under UN administration (UN Mission in Kosovo) with an international military presence (KFOR) led by NATO. Kosovo Albanians want an independent state and their main political parties have cooperated with UNMIK in building up Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The Serbian minority, however, fear for their future outside Serbia and, rather than cooperate with UNMIK, have maintained their own ‘parallel institutions’ - courts, schools and health care services. The UN Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari has proposed ‘independence under international supervision’.

Albanian minorities in states neighbouring Kosovo have been involved in risings since the war - in Preshevo Valley (south Serbia) and Macedonia - underlining the potential of this situation to ‘destabilise’ neighbouring territories.

The Ahtisaari plan

The UN Special Envoy has recommended that Kosovo should be granted independence under international supervision and with a continued NATO-led international military presence. Claiming to have “exhausted every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement” (negotiated between the governments in Belgrade and Prishtina), Ahtisaari argues that the issue of Kosovo’s status must be resolved urgently because the uncertainty is “a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development … and inter-ethnic reconciliation”. To address Serbian concerns, Ahtisaari proposes ‘decentralisation’, in practice enhancing the powers of four municipalities where there is a Kosovo Serb majority and establishing two new Serb-controlled municipalities. ‘Decentralisation’ would permit extensive municipal cooperation with Belgrade, involve municipalities in appointing local police chiefs, and make them responsible for education at all levels and both primary and secondary health care.

While independence is unpalatable for most Serbs, Kosovo Albanians suspect that Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs would use this ‘decentralisation’ plan to engineer some kind of de facto partition of Kosovo.

▲Top▲

War in Kosovo

In the winter of 1997-98, the Kosova Liberation Army began to claim that it had ‘liberated’ areas of Kosovo. This was mainly theatre: it had only a couple of hundred of members at this time, and up to mid-January 1998 claimed to have killed just 21 people - 10 Serbian and 11 Albanian ‘traitors’. The Yugoslav government then ordered a special security offensive to wipe out the KLA. However, their atrocities - the ‘Drenica massacres’ in which they slaughtered whole extended families - had the reverse effect. Thousands of Albanians flocked to join the KLA, and fighting escalated. In 1998, more than 300,000 Albanians were displaced and nearly 2,000 killed in Kosovo. Most of those killed were neither armed nor members of the KLA; of the few KLA members killed, most were extra-judicially executed, not killed in battle.

Following the breakdown of the Rambouillet negotiations, the war reached its height with the NATO bombing campaign of March-June 1999 and the wholesale ethnic cleansing campaign by Serbian forces. Some 850,000 Albanians fled Kosovo, while half a million more were ‘internally displaced’. Between March and June, more than a third of Kosovo’s housing stock was damaged or destroyed, some by shelling, mostly by being set on fire by Serbian security forces or paramilitaries.

The probable death toll was something near 10,000 people, the great majority being Albanians. There remain more than 2,000 people missing, mostly Albanian but more than 20% Serb. From president Milosevic and his generals down, a number of Serbs have been indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal on Former-Yugoslavia in The Hague. .In order to hide evidence of their war crimes, Serbian forces transported more than 1,000 cadavers from Kosovo into Serbia proper - more than 1,000 corpses have been exhumed since the fall of Milosevic.

The Serbian security forces organised the rape of an unknown number of Albanian women.

Some KLA members have been indicted for war crimes - including Ramush Haradinaj, elected prime minister of Kosovo in 2004. These crimes include acts against Albanians as well as Serbs.

No representatives of NATO are being prosecuted for war crimes, despite the serious criticisms levelled at NATO’s conduct of the war by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Since the war hundreds of people have been injured by unexploded ordnance - land mines mainly placed by Serbian forces, and cluster bombs recklessly dropped by US and British planes. NATO used munitions made with depleted uranium, but continues to deny that this can cause health problems for the local population and its own troops.

▲Top▲

Build-up to war

For most of the 1990s, Kosovo was described as a place of ‘neither war nor peace’. Slobodan Milosevic annulled Kosovo’ autonomy in 1989 and 1990, imposing the Serbian education curriculum, dismissing more than 70% of those Albanians in employment, and relocating businesses and machinery to Serbia proper while allowing the province’s mines to rust and rot.

Throughout the 1990s, Serbian police and paramilitaries committed acts of brutality against the Albanian population of Kosovo that were documented by local, Belgrade-based and international human rights groups, including UN special rapporteurs. Believing that Belgrade wanted to provoke war, Albanians switched to a policy of ‘refusing to be provoked’. Their non-violent strategy centred on declaring their independence and organising their own rudimentary state, electing a president (Ibrahim Rugova), providing schooling from primary to university level for around 350,000 pupils and students, building up a network of health clinics independent of the Serbian system, and introducing a system of voluntary taxation. Almost the entire Albanian population was involved in this despite widespread police harassment, mainly in the form of beatings.

▲Top▲

Post-war violence

Even before NATO troops entered Kosovo on 10 June 1999, thousands of Serbian families were already leaving. In the law and order vacuum of the next six months, hundreds of Serbs were killed in Kosovo. According to Amnesty International, 1,300 Serbs and 800 Roma were abducted. Thousands more were driven out of their homes. Properties vacated by Serbs were sometimes occupied, sometimes torched. Most of the remaining Serbs re-grouped into enclaves protected by international forces. In the particularly symbolic case of Mitrovica, Serbs evicted Albanians living north of the river and organised their own vigilantes.

There have been sporadic attacks by Albanians on Serbs since 1999, most notably in March 2004, when 19 Serbs were killed and many more fled from their homes in reaction to a false rumour (reported as fact in local media) that four Albanian children had been drowned after being chased by Serbs. In general, those Serbs remaining in Kosovo complain of lack of security and lack of freedom of movement.

Each year since UNMIK was established, the number of murders in Kosovo has fallen, and most of these are not inter-ethnic. However, intimidation is widespread - both on an ethnic basis and between different factions of the Albanian population.

▲Top▲

Post-war institution building

The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) has headed the international humanitarian operation with the highest funding per capita. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been in charge of democracy-building, the European Union (EU) and World Bank of economic revival, while NATO has led the international military presence - initially more than 50,000 troops, now down to around 16,000. On top of this there has been an UNMIK police force which has gradually been reduced to around 1,300 as a multi-ethnic 7,000-strong local police force has been built up.

Following the elections of November 2001 and the establishment of Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, Kosovo regained most of the powers of self-government it had lost in 1989, only now as a UN protectorate rather than an autonomous province of Yugoslavia. In his report in 2005, UN rapporteur Kai Eide was impressed with the progress of the parliamentary system but observed that “the Kosovo police and judiciary are fragile institutions” faced with serious problems of organised crime - including property rackets and human trafficking - and corruption.

The new Kosovo Police Service draws on all ethnic groups, despite the intimidation of Serb police by their own communities, and has succeeded in integrating Albanians sacked from the police force in 1989 and Serbs from the pre-1999 force. It has been heralded as one of the successes of institution-building, despite its limited role in dealing with civil disorder and its lack of effectiveness in various places during the March 2004 anti-Serb attacks.

An institution that has been particularly problematic has been the Kosovo Protections Corps, headed until 2006 by the current Prime Minister, Agim Çeku, a former KLA commander. The KPC exists to respond to disasters and to provide humanitarian assistance, including de-mining and physical reconstruction. Its formation, however, was part of the negotiations to ‘demilitarise’ the KLA - and most of its members are KLA veterans. Some have been accused of post-war killings and several senior officers were removed on suspicion of helping Albanian insurgents in Macedonia. Normally unarmed, it is expressly forbidden from taking part in law enforcement or defence. However, most Kosovo Albanians see the KPC as the nucleus of the army for an independent Kosovo. Ahtisaari says its work has been done and proposes to disband it within a year.

UNMIK itself cannot be considered to have been a model for ‘good practice’ in governance. External investigators have identified problems of corruption within the institution and human rights groups have criticised its ‘unaccountability’. Feminist researchers further argue that under UNMIK Kosovo has moved from being a transit point for sex trafficking to becoming a destination.

▲Top▲

Kosovo’s economy

Kosovo was always the poorest unit in former-Yugoslavia, having the highest unemployment and the greatest dependence on money sent home from family members working abroad. An enormous amount of physical reconstruction has taken place since the war, but Kosovo’s economy remains trapped in what the current head of UNMIK has called “a vicious circle of low growth, high unemployment, fiscal imbalances and foreign trade imbalances”.

Kosovo imports 24 times as much as it exports. Only 16% of registered businesses are in manufacturing and production. The Kosovo ‘grey economy’ includes practices condemned by intergovernmental bodies - from children selling cigarettes in the streets, through wholesale multimedia piracy, to sex trafficking. The international presence has expanded the market for all these. In addition, a traditional ‘grey economy’ makes it extremely difficult to calculate the real rate of unemployment. More than half the population of Kosovo is rural and engage in subsistence farming, which means that people will register as ‘available for employment’ while carrying out work on the family’s land.

▲Top▲

Local politics

Local politics remain polarised. Among Kosovo Albanians, the parties are divided mainly by personality and historical allegiances. The main parties demand independence without elaborating distinct social policies. A history of inter-party intimidation and violence means that the main parties now have their own security wings. It is a sign of the continued male domination of Kosovo Albanian politics that not one woman was chosen to be part of the negotiating team in 2007.

Serbian politicians in general have preferred not to cooperate with the institutions brought into existence under UNMIK. Especially in the three northernmost Serbian municipalities (which border Serbia), the local political leaders tend to be more answerable to Belgrade than to local Serbs. While there are differences between the Serb communities neighbouring Serbia and those in Albanian-majority areas, Belgrade retains considerable influence as it pays the staff salaries for the Serbian ‘parallel institutions’.

▲Top▲

Civil society

After the war, some 2,000 bodies registered as ‘NGOs’ with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Today it is clear that most of these do not have any real existence, but were registered mainly in order to apply for the numerous grants from international humanitarian organisations seeking local partners. In many cases - including a number of ‘peace’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘anti-violence’ projects - NGOs stopped work when their contract expired.

Some of the most active predominantly Albanian NGOs have grown out of groups established during the non-violent struggle. These include the members of the Kosova Women’s Network, the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, the humanitarian Mother Theresa Association, and Kosovan Nansen Dialogue. Reacting to the exclusion of women from the official talks on the future of Kosovo, the Kosova Women’s Networks and women’s groups from Serbia meet for their own unofficial discussions, producing statements about the conflict and discussing principles for its resolution.

The OSCE and various non-governmental international organisations have tried to nurse cross-community projects into existence, especially to involve youth and women. One problem is the historic weakness of independent organisations on the Serbian side, where life has previously been oriented more around official institutions or the Orthodox Church.

Other ethnic minorities - most noticeably Bosniaks - also have formed associations that look to address social issues and play their part in building a peaceful Kosovo.

▲Top▲

The Serbs in Kosovo

It is estimated that there are nearly 130,000 Serbs in Kosovo, nearly half of them living in areas north of the river Ibar neighbouring Serbia, and the rest in Albanian-majority areas. They have their own courts, schools and health care facilities, with Belgrade paying judges, teachers and medical professionals salaries double what they would receive in Serbia itself (a 100% bonus as an incentive to stay in Kosovo). Until 2006 these wages were generally augmented by a salary from the budget of Kosovo’s ‘provisional institutions’.

The Serbian communities try to carry on their lives as if they live in Serbia, using the Serbian currency (the dinar, whereas the rest of Kosovo use the euro), the Cyrillic alphabet, the Serbian mobile telephone company, etc. However, there are significant differences between Serbs that have yet to find a clear political expression. For instance, many Serbs say they would simply leave an independent Kosovo. Yet those who live in the southern areas of Kosovo are more oriented towards trying to stay, adapting as have Muslim Slavs (the Bosniak and Gorani minorities). Moreover, the Orthodox Church - a fierce lobbyist for greater involvement by all Serbs in the issue of Kosovo - will never abandon Kosovo, no matter who governs it.

▲Top▲

The issue of ‘minority’ return

UNMIK declared that one of the ‘benchmarks’ for its success would be the return of members of ethnic minorities to Kosovo. Belgrade, on the other hand, seeks to use the issue of the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo in its campaign against independence for Kosovo.

It is unclear how many members of ethnic minorities left Kosovo. Belgrade claims 250,000, mainly Serbs. This is a propaganda figure that exceeds the total population of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo at the time of the 1991 census. The UNHCR does not have a separate register, but has noted problems of double counting, and also that some displaced people are commuting to Kosovo.

Non-Serb members of minorities have been readier than Serbs to return. Of the nearly 16,000 minority returnees since 1999, fewer than half are Serbs. A visitor to Kosovo can see newly built houses standing empty, guarded by international security firms, waiting for someone to return. It is difficult to know how many displaced people actually want to return. Numbers of minority returnees actually declined in 2006 - for lack of economic opportunities, in view of the uncertainty of the territory’s status, and because of concerns about security.

Many Serbs have already sold their property in Kosovo, and most Prishtina Serbs (the Serb population of Prishtina was as high as 40,000) are probably resigned to never living there again. International agencies report that many displaced Serbs, eight years after the war, would rather rebuild their lives in Serbia proper. However, Belgrade has refused to cooperate with the housing or training schemes in Serbia proposed by international agencies.

▲Top▲

Pre-Yugoslav History

The pre-twentieth century history of Kosovo is a source of endless dispute, especially because Albanians and Serbs have learnt two different versions of history. Albanians consider themselves ‘autochthonous’ to Kosovo, and celebrate Albanian resistance to the Ottoman Empire and later Kosovo’s role as a centre of the Albanian renaissance. Serbs on the other hand look back to the Orthodox Church and the medieval kingdom of Serbia, and celebrate Kosovo as ‘the cradle of Serbian civilisation’.

The fact that both Albanians and Serbs were several times in alliance against the Ottomans - , including at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo - is ignored Three centuries later, the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian empire and its allies led to mass migration and harsher conditions for Christians inside Kosovo. Henceforth the Orthodox Serbs would always be a minority in Kosovo, and Kosovo Albanians would be predominantly Muslim - albeit rather with regards to observing Ramadan and the consumption of ham or alcohol.

▲Top▲

Kosovo’s history in Yugoslavia

As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Kosovo was conquered by Serbia in 1912 and so - after the First World War - became part of Yugoslavia (literally ‘the land of the south Slavs’). As the largest non-Slav ethnic group, Yugoslav Albanians were subject to discrimination, including confiscation of land and the prohibition of Albanian schools. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Yugoslav government tried to encourage Serb settlement in Kosovo, offering financial incentives and land. Nevertheless Albanians remained the majority population and, during the German and Italian occupation in the Second World War, drove out thousands of Serbian settlers.

Josip Broz Tito’s Partisans tried to enlist Albanian support by promising Kosovo self-determination, and when this did not happen after the war, thousands of Albanians were slaughtered in the ‘pacification’ of Kosovo. The new Socialist Yugoslavia again introduced discriminatory policies, while in the 1950s the secret police headed by Tito’s security chief Aleksandr Ranković terrorised Kosovo and thousands of Albanians were ‘transferred’ to live in Turkey.

The fall of Ranković in 1966 and the subsequent Yugoslav-wide process of ‘decentralisation’ brought Kosovo Albanians expanded educational provision in their own language as well as greater access to employment and management positions. Serbs in Kosovo continued to be better off than Albanians, but their numbers began to fall, while the number of Albanians continued to rise and the proportional difference became even greater.

When Kosovo Albanians demanded that Kosovo become a republic in the student demonstrations of 1981, this sent shockwaves throughout the socialist Yugoslavia and brought a new wave of fierce repression to Kosovo. The demand was interpreted and proclaimed by Serb nationalists as but a step towards secession; indeed many believed that Kosovo Albanians were harassing Serbs to leave Kosovo in order to prepare for this secession. Albanians subsequently became the main figure of Serbian hate propaganda. Accusations of ‘cultural genocide’ were accompanied by incredibly exaggerated statistics about the ‘expulsion’ of Serbs. From 1987 onwards, Slobodan Milosevic allied himself with this campaign, posing as the protector of Kosovo Serbs.

▲Top▲

Religion in Kosovo

Serbs often describe the conflict in Kosovo in religious terms, referring to Muslim domination. Albanians repeatedly stress that it is not a religious conflict - that their community does have a Muslim majority but also a significant Catholic minority and, after several decades under ‘Communism’, many non-believers. In the period of the non-violent struggle, Kosovo Albanians observed Western religious festivals as well as Muslim ones. In contrast, there is a mixture of hostility and respect towards the Orthodox Church. Most Kosovo Albanians are proud that Kosovo is home to historic Orthodox monasteries and that Albanians have historically guarded Serbian sacred sites. At the same time, they condemn the role played by the Orthodox Church in spreading hate propaganda about Albanians in the 1980s. Few Kosovo Albanians know that some Orthodox monasteries offered protection to Albanians in 1998-99.

▲Top▲

Latest Update from CrisisWatch (September 2007)

Belgrade and Pristina negotiators met 30 August in Vienna for new round of status talks; both stipulated series of red lines ahead of meeting. PM Ceku threatened to declare independence if talks inconclusive. EU, Russian and U.S. mediators Wolfgang Ischinger, Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko and Frank Wisner visited Belgrade and Pristina 10-11 August; troika to report to UNSG Ban Ki-moon by 10 December, but disagree on whether date should be deadline for resolving status. EU anti-partition stance undermined by Ischinger and Dutch FM Verhagen statements suggesting possibility if sides agreed. Ischinger later retreated; Kosovar negotiators threatened to leave talks if option raised.

UNMIK set assembly, municipal and mayoral elections for 17 November. Belgrade spokesman said return of 1,000 Serb security personnel to Kosovo, following Serbian National Council of Northern Kosovo request to Belgrade, would be timely 16 August. Belgrade alleged NATO seeking Kosovo as “satellite state”. Ethnic Serb girl raped by 3 unknown assailants 20 August in second such attack in Gracanica this year.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

▲Top▲

Resources, Links and References

Insight on Conflict is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

Amnesty International on former Yugoslav states - Archive of reports, news releases and urgent actions published from 1996 to date covering Serbia and Montenegro.

Balkan Investigative Reporting Network - News on latest training, publication and debates, plus BIRN has produced a documentary “Kosovo: Does anyone have a plan?” exploring different perceptions on the future for Kosovo.

CARE country profile and projects in Kosovo.

European Stability Initiatives reports on Kosovo - In-depth analysis from this non-profit research and policy institute on the issues involved in promoting stability and prosperity.

Human Rights Watch on Serbia - An overview of the human rights issues in the area.

Humanitarian Law Centre - Belgrade human rights group.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre on former Yugoslav states - Analysis and reports from an international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement.

International Crisis Group on Kosovo - Country profile and updates.

Kai Eide’s report on Standards in Kosovo - A 2005 UN-commissioned report on the future of Kosovo written by a Norwegian diplomat.

Kosova Women’s Network - A network of women’s groups and organizations from across Kosovo that advocates on behalf of women at local, regional, and international level.

Kosovan Nansen Dialogue- A non-profit organisation which aims to contribute to reconciliation and peacebuilding through inter-ethnic dialogue.

Kosovo Force (KFOR) - The NATO-led Kosovo Force which currently has approximately 16,000 troops in the region to guarantee security and stability.

OSCE Mission in Kosovo - The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is mandated with promoting human rights and the rule of law in the region.

ReliefWeb on Serbia - Information on the humanitarian situation in the region through the online vehicle of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Serbian Orthodox Church - Kosovo, Land of the Living Past.

Swisspeace’s FAST Kosovo Update - The latest early warning report from the peace research institute, Swisspeace.

United Nations Office for the Special Envoy for Kosovo - Martti Ahtisaari.

UNIFEM on Kosovo.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission on Kosovo (UNMIK).

USAID on Kosovo.

Vetëvendosje - Movement for Self-Determination.

Publications and Documents

Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo, by Miranda Vickers (Christopher Hurst/Columbia University Press, 1998) - A history from medieval times.

Civil Resistance in Kosovo, by Howard Clark (Pluto, 2000) - Mainly on non-violent struggle.

Kosovo: A Short History, by Noel Malcolm (Macmillan, 1998) - Examines the historical controversies from the year dot.

Kosovo: How myths and truths started a war, by Julie Mertus (University of California Press, 1999) - Explores the contrasting perceptions of Albanians and Serbs and the widening gulf between them from 1981-1990.

Kosovo: War and Revenge, by Tim Judah (Yale University Press, 2000) - Mainly on the 1998-99 war.

▲Top▲

Share This

Introduction

With its ancient culture and the Himalayas as a backdrop, the landlocked South Asian Kingdom of Nepal has for many years been the destination of choice for foreign travellers in search of adventure. With a size roughly twice that of Ireland and a population of 26.3 million, Nepal is also one of the poorest countries in the world.

Nepal has been under the sway of a hereditary monarchy or ruling family for most of its known history. A brief experiment with multi-party politics in 1959-1960 ended with late King Mahendra suspending parliament and taking sole charge. Democratic politics was introduced in 1991 after popular protests, but it has been extremely factionalised with frequent changes of government.

Nepal is presently engaged in an internal armed conflict with the insurgence of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) People’s War; the resulting efforts of suppression by the police and now the army; and a peaceful resistance by the seven party alliance since February 2005 against the absolute monarchy. The “People’s War” is an armed uprising by Maoist insurgents that started on February 12, 1996 under the leadership of Puspa Kamal Dahal, widely known as “Comrade Prachanda.” The triangular conflict has led the country to the brink of civil war with the predictable danger of the conflict becoming protracted over the coming years.

The present political crisis in

▲Top▲

Conflict Dynamics

This Hindu kingdom, once perceived as idyllic, became a multi-party democracy in 1990 again after almost 30 years of the party-less Panchyat system led by the absolute monarch. The multiparty democracy was in its early stages with an underdeveloped and thus largely fragmented civil society. There is a lack of leadership with insufficient democratic experience in the means and ways of governing. Given these circumstances, the constitutional monarchy supported by the army exhibits differences in comparison to constitutional monarchies in the West.

In the beginning of the People’s War, assuming the “cause of the people” provided considerable political credibility for the CPN-M. The open political environment under the multiparty democracy and the failure of the political parties to govern the country democratically have created opportunities for the CPN-M to establish support, allowing them to launch this violent attack against the state machinery. Besides, the system and state structure constructed in the constitution of 1990 were incapable of dealing with the political agendas advocated by the CPN (Maoists).

The CPN-M maintains that the main objective of the People’s War is to establish the rule of the proletariat in

The conflict dynamics have changed since the monarchy assumed absolute power through a royal-military coup in February 2005. The King, who was acting behind the scenes throughout the period of conflict and political crisis, has come to the forefront as a visible actor in the conflict. It was relatively easy for the King to marginalize the parties, particularly after they were driven from the countryside by the armed conflict. The parties are held as emblematic of all aspects of democracy in

Military escalation has eclipsed political strategies for peace and the army is becoming active in wider aspects of Nepali political life and governance. There is a policy void and a lack of political leadership with regards to progress towards peace.

▲Top▲

Contributory Factors

The conflict has various dimensions involving social, economic and political complexities.

Political, legal, social, ethnic, economic, and international factors have significantly contributed to the instability in the country. The People’s War started in the most remote and least developed areas of

▲Top▲

Chronology of Events

Currently, the country is going through a number of crises and political complexities. “People’s War” was declared in

Thus, on the one hand, the parliamentarian political parties have set to launch a peaceful resistance against the absolute monarchy, while, on the other, the country is presently engaged in an internal armed conflict with the insurgence of the Maoists. The “People’s War” is an armed uprising by Maoist insurgents that started on February 13, 1996, under the leadership of Puspa Kamal Dahal, widely known as “Comrade Prachanda”. The armed struggle launched by the CPN (Maoists), the peaceful movement of the seven party alliance and violent reprisal by the royal regime have led the country to the brink of civil war with the predictable danger of the conflict becoming protracted over the coming years.

Neverthless, attempts were made to end of the armed conflict through a political settlement. Negotiations failed in November 2001 and again in August 2003 between the Government of Nepal and the CPN-M. After the failure of negotiations in November 2001 with the declaration of a State of

▲Top▲

Impact of the Conflict

In any conflict situation, it is difficult to quantify the impact, effects and consequences in terms of the costs it has incurred, and there is always a challenge to produce solid statistics. Nevertheless, efforts have been made by the non-government organisations in

Regarding the negative impact of the war, a report published by the National Peace Campaign in January 2004 estimates that the conflict may have cost the country’s GDP 66.2 billion rupees by the end of 2003. By the end of 2006, nearly 13,000 people will have lost their lives, thousands have been tortured and imprisoned, and an estimated two to three hundred thousand people have been internally displaced. Refugee flows to

Nevertheless, the conflict has also had some positive impact and brought change to Nepalese society. The issue of discrimination based on caste, gender and ethnicity has entered the national agenda. The marginalised and disadvantaged communities are now looking for their role in the nation-building process, and the demand for state restructuring is at a high. The armed conflict has challenged the feudal system, from village level to the relevance of the monarchy in the country. Precisely, the conflict has destroyed the roots of feudal structure at the grassroot level, which may prove to be highly instrumental for sustaining democracy in the long run.

▲Top▲

Key Political Actors

There is a wide range of domestic and international actors involved in the Nepalese conflict. The internal conflict in

CPN (Maoists): The party resorted to armed rebellion in 1996. Ideologically, it believes in the rule of the proletariat. However, it has expressed commitment to multi-party democracy and human rights, and reached to 12-point agreement with the parliamentary political parties in November 2005. Regarding its agenda and proposed process to end the current political crisis, it advocates (a) round table dialogue, (b) interim government, and (c) constituent assembly.

Palace and Royal

Seven Party

▲Top▲

Efforts towards Negotiation

At first, the government responded with all available security forces to challenge the armed insurgency. When this proved largely ineffective and talks broke off in November 2001, the government deployed the army as a last resort. In addition, a state of emergency was declared and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention and Control) Ordinance enacted, granting unlimited power to the authorities and security forces. The involvement of the armed forces and the availability of the anti-terrorist law have encouraged the government to crush the “terrorism” by sheer force. This application of brute force has wrought little change in the resultant daily deepening of the crisis.

The government adopted a military approach to suppress the dissenting voices, which further motivated the youths and disadvantaged groups to accelerate the armed struggle, thus supporting the agendas of the CPN (Maoists). Nevertheless, efforts towards a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict continued amidst the spiralling violence. Those initiatives are as follows:

Dhami Commission: The first initiative to understand the nature of armed conflict and look for ways of resolving the conflict through political means was launched in April 1997 by the coalition government headed by Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand. The government formed a working group which highlighted work through national consensus as a means to deal with the armed conflict.

Deuba Commission: In January 2000, the government headed by Prime Minister Krishna P. Bhattarai formed a high level commission under the chairmanship of Sher B. Deuba. The Deuba Committee held a series of consultations with the major stakeholders and recommended a political settlement of the armed conflict. Meanwhile, the government was reshuffled and the recommendation was not implemented.

Informal Dialogue: In the end of 2000, home minister Ramchandra Paudel held an informal dialogue with Mr. Rabindra Shrestha, a politburo member of the CPN (Maoists). The dialogue was facilitated by a human rights activist, Padma Ratna Tuladhar. But the informal dialogue ended in mutual recrimination.

First Official Initiative: The government led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba initiated the first official dialogue with the CPN (Maoists) upon coming to power in June 2001. A ceasefire was announced by both sides and three rounds of peace talks were held. The negotiation process ended in November 2001 upon the unilateral withdrawal by the CPN (Maoists) and following the attacks on army barracks in Dang by the Maoists.

Second Official Initiative: The second official initiatives were taken by the royal government led by Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand, an appointee of the King, in January 2003 and the government led by prime Surya Bahadur Thapa, also appointed by the King, in May 2003. Both parties agreed to a ceasefire and held several rounds of formal and informal talks. The negotiation process ended in August 2003 without bringing any substantial results. The CPN (Maoists) withdrew from the negotiation process stating that the government was not sincere in peace talks or on political agendas. The Dhoramba massacre, in which the RNA killed 15 non-armed Maoists cadres, served as a pretext for ending the negotiation process.

Stalled Peace Process: The official peace process has been stalled since August 2003. There has been no initiative by either side to resume the peace talks. Nevertheless, the CPN (Maoists) announced four months of unilateral ceasefire last year. The royal regime simply turned down the prospects for ceasefire and peace talks stating that the Maoists’ ceasefire was a ploy.

▲Top▲

2006 Update

The historic people’s movement of 2062-63 (2006) has forced the King to step down. The dissolved parliament has been restored with the mandate of the people’s movement. The restored parliament has made many historic declarations, including the decision to go to the constituent assembly, which is the major political demand of the CPN (Maoists). However, the Nepalese people believe that the constituent assembly has begun to follow a national agenda following the 12-point Understanding reached between the CPN (Maoists) and parliamentarian political parties, and the historical declaration of the restored parliament. Both the government and the rebels have announced cease-fires, formed dialogue teams, signed codes of conduct and are currently in peace talks.

▲Top▲

2007 Update

Following two rounds of failed negotiations in 2001 and 2003, the government of Nepal and the insurgent CPN (Maoists) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006. With the success of people’s uprising in April-May 2006, the drivers of peace were stronger and there was a higher level of political will to end the war.

In a historic declaration, the restored parliament unanimously passed a resolution to hold elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, which was a key political demand of the CPN (Maoists). By invitation and agreement of both parties, the United Nations will monitor the elections and administer an arms management programme.

Key elements of the Peace Agreements are concerned with the modalities of power transfer and addressing the costs of the armed conflict including: (a) future of the monarchy to be decided by the constituent assembly, (b) arms management reform in army, (c) state restructuring, and (d) establishment of a Truth and Peace Commission.

Despite the positive developments, Nepal’s peace process has still been less than participatory from the beginning. The negotiation process has not been inclusive as it does not involve representatives from women, Dalits, Terai people, and Janajati communities. The recent identity-based violence and unrest in the Terai areas of the country, in January-February 2007, has to be seen from this perspective. There are many identity-groups in Nepal, in particular the Terai, Janajatis and Dalits, who are looking for an appropriate opportunity to get their voices heard in the peace process.

Certainly, the peace process is also a nation-building process, and the concerns of identity-groups for participation in the peace process are genuine and legitimate. The challenge now will be to hear and address the concerns of all groups to ensure that triggering factors do not provoke violence and identity-based conflicts, and that all groups can participate in the nation-building process.

▲Top▲

Latest Update from CrisisWatch (September 2007)

Government figures underscored commitment to 22 November poll date after much-denied reports Maoist leader Prachanda mooted 5-month postponement. Maoists threatened protests ahead of elections to secure guarantee new government will declare Nepal republic. King Gyanendra vacated Nagarjuna palace 24 August after government moved to nationalise 20 royal properties.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

▲Top▲

Resources, Links and References

Insight on Conflict is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

Amnesty Nepal - News, reports, and publications on the Nepalese conflict, in English and Nepali.

CARE - Country profile and projects run by CARE in Nepal.

Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance - News reports on the Nepalese conflict from the last 7 days.

Concern - Country profile, news, and stories from Nepal.

Ethnologue - A guide to the languages and ethnicities of Nepal.

Himal Magazine - Monthly publication on Himalayan current affairs.

INSEC - Nepal’s first Human Rights news website.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center - Comprehensive overview of the Nepalese conflict, including the latest figures on IDP’s.

International Alert - Background information and projects run by IA in Nepal.

International Crisis Group - Comprehensive resource for information on Nepalese conflict.

International Nepal Solidarity Network - News, analysis and documents relating to the conflict in Nepal, in English and Nepali.

Kantinpur - General news site, in English and Nepali

National Peace Campaign - Includes details of NPC’s projects in Nepal, a history of the conflict, and publications in Nepali.

Nepal Homepage - Provides links to a wide range of information on Nepal.

Nepalnews.com - Up-to-date news and commentary on Nepali current affairs.

Nepal Research - Website on Nepal and Himalayan Studies.

Peace Brigades International - Latest news and reports, plus details of PBI’s projects in Nepal.

ReliefWeb - A leading on-line gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters.

SAFHR - South Asian Forum for Human Rights - contains articles and publications relating to the Nepali conflict.

South Asia Analysis Group - Political analysis reports and papers on international and political affairs in Nepal.

University of Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Detailed overview and commentary on Nepali conflict.

USAID - Country profile, updates, and projects relating to Nepalese development.

Publications and Documents

Peace Dialogue, by National Peace Campaign, Kathmandu, 2005.

Costs of the War, by National Peace Campaign, Kathmandu, 2004.

Class, State and Struggle in Nepal, by Mikesell and Stephen Lawrence. New Delhi, Manohar, 1999.

Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Major Powers and Nepal, by Khadka Narayan. New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1997.

Nepal in Crisis: Growth and Stagnation at the Periphery, by Blaikie Piers, John Cameron, and David Seddon. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.

People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Political Change in Nepal, by Martin Hoftun et al. Kathmandu, Mandala, 1999.

‘The Maoist Insurgence and Crisis of Governability in Nepal’, by Panchan Maharjan. In Dhurba Kumar (ed.), Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000, pp. 163-196.

Women, Politico-Economic Rationale of People’s War, by Baburam Bhattarai. Kathmandu, Utprerak Prakashan, 1998.

Women, War and Peace in South Asia, by Rita Manchanda. New Delhi, Sage, 2000.

▲Top▲

Share This

In every conflict there are local people working for peace. Their skills and experiences are crucial to understanding and resolving conflict, but their stories are seldom heard and their knowledge rarely utilised.

Insight on Conflict (IoC) is a unique resource for everyone interested in the activities of grassroots peacebuilders. It provides access to the inspiring and valuable lessons of those living in conflict areas and working for peace.

IoC provides comprehensive overviews of selected conflict areas and detailed information about organisations and initiatives working for peace in those areas.

Share This

Background

The Colombian conflict involves the state and three main non-state armed groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by their Spanish initials, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which are left-wing guerrilla groups, and the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), which is an umbrella organisation of right-wing paramilitary groups. Many accounts site the origin of the current conflict with the founding of FARC in 1964; others argue that its roots date back to earlier conflicts (such as a period known as La Violencia starting in 1948); and still others claim that there has not been one continuous conflict since the 1960s but a series of conflicts with periods of peace in between.

▲Top▲

Geography

Colombia is a large territory, one sixth of which is tropical Amazon forest. The country is relatively sparsely populated, and the road network is poor. These conditions contribute to a great diversity in attitudes and perceptions towards the conflict since violence is inflicted and experienced very differently in different regions. Particular forms of violence affect different sectors of society and different geographical regions to a greater or lesser extent, but the whole country is affected in some way or other.

The complexities of the violence in Colombia have given rise to a uniquely Colombian academic discipline, ‘violentology’, and the literature no longer refers to violence in the singular but to ‘las violencias’, to highlight its multiple manifestations. In general the situation is more uncertain and difficult in the countryside than in the cities, although a recent increase in urban guerrilla tactics may be shifting the balance slightly. From 1992 to 2003, the number of combatants (guerrilla, military and paramilitary) increased and the violence spread geographically. The country also saw a parallel increase in conflict-related crime as combatants increased their participation in the drug trade, extortion, kidnapping, money laundering, illegal exploitation of minerals, and common theft in order to finance the violence.

▲Top▲

International Influences

The conflict has become increasingly internationalised and the United States has become more involved by providing financial and military assistance to the Colombian government for counter-narcotics and, more recently, counter-insurgency operations. Since the 1980s, the US has, according to Leech (2002), poured in ‘hundreds of millions of dollars of aid and arms, along with hundreds of military personnel – worsening the violence, threatening the fragile stability of the region, and increasing the suffering of the Colombian people.’ Such a level of involvement must have considerable impact, whether positive or negative. The internationalisation of conflict is by no means unique to Colombia, and the increasing international involvement in conflicts has become more and more common as the notion of state sovereignty breaks down (Kaldor 2001).

▲Top▲

Levels of Violence

Colombia has the highest kidnapping rate in the world and more than fifty thousand people have died in political violence since 1980. However, distinguishing between conflict-related and non conflict-related crime is very difficult and it may be more useful to consider the total number of homicides. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2004), in 2000 there were 26,539 intentional homicides recorded in Colombia, a rate of 62.74 per 100,000 inhabitants; only one country (Swaziland) had a higher rate.

▲Top▲

Economic Impact of the Conflict

It is likely that the conflict has led to a lower GDP per capita, lower domestic savings in absolute terms, less investment (domestic and foreign), and reduced government revenue. Transaction-intensive activities within the private sector are likely to have fallen relative to less transaction-intensive ones, and an increasing proportion of government expenditure is likely to be devoted to the military, at the expense of economic and social spending.

Conflict generates direct costs (losses of physical and human capital) and indirect costs (divestment and allocative distortion – the use of productive assets to fight the rebellion). Economist ‘violentólogists’ have been attempting to measure these costs in Colombia for several years (Rubio 1997; Arbeláez et al 2002; Riascos and Vargas 2004) but there remains extensive debate as to the accuracy of different methods of calculation. One estimate suggests that had Colombia achieved peace 20 years ago, the income of an average Colombian today would be 50 percent higher and 2.5 million more children would be living above the poverty line (US$2 per day).

▲Top▲

Internal Displacement

In recent years, hundreds of thousands of Colombians have been forcibly displaced by all parties in the armed conflict. This is often not just a by-product of the conflict, but represents a deliberate strategy to move or terrorise populations. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2000), there were a total of 1.8 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Colombia in 1999, while the Norwegian Refugee Council claims there were 2.9 million in 2003. Displacement affects all 32 departments of Colombia, both in terms of expulsion and reception, though regions of expulsion are predominantly rural.

Forced displacement is a defining characteristic of the Colombian conflict, and has particular implications in the context of poverty and development. Colombia has very advanced legislation on IDPs but displaced people are often not able to claim all of the official support to which they are entitled, and tend to live on very low incomes with little or no access to healthcare. In addition, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that in 2005 44% of IDPs in Colombia were aged between 5 and 14, and 70% of displaced children never return to school.

▲Top▲

Peace Processes

Although there have been gaps in the process, Colombian governments have been trying to make peace since the formal end of the Frente Nacional and the presidency of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978). Limited successes have been achieved, such as the demobilisation of some guerrilla groups and their incorporation into electoral politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the rewriting of the constitution in 1991. The level of violence has varied, but peace has remained elusive.

President Pastrana (1998 to 2002) launched a peace process based on negotiation but critics labelled the approach (which involved ceding an area of land the size of Switzerland to the FARC) too soft. The talks collapsed as it became clear that the FARC were using the demilitarised zone to re-assert their military capabilities. In 2002, the current president Alvaro Uribe was elected on the promise of a much tougher stance against the guerrilla groups and since then he has followed a tough “democratic security” policy and levels of violence have gone down, particularly in urban areas.

A controversial demobilisation process for the right wing AUC started in 2003 under the Justice and Peace Law. According to this law, those accused of massacres and other serious acts can benefit from reduced sentences in return for confession, cooperation and surrendering any illegally obtained assets. Furthermore, if they go along with this process, the Colombian government will not extradite them to the United States on drugs charges. From a human rights perspective, the Justice and Peace Law has been criticised as too lenient. Reportedly, some 30,000 paramilitaries have disarmed.

Despite this apparent success, however, there are two key problems even beyond the criticisms already mentioned. The first relates to what the demobilised paramilitaries will do now, and how to prevent their return to violent crime. The second relates to the links between the government and paramilitary violence in the past. Although such links have been well documented in the past by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, new accusations have come out during the trials of former paramilitary leaders and some prominent politicians (including some very close to Uribe) have been named. This may not be good for the country’s government and its reputation in the short run, but in the longer term it is important to uncover the truth about official involvement in the violence.

Uribe’s efforts at peace have focused on the demobilisation of the paramilitaries. However, any peace process in Colombia needs to deal with more than one armed group, and Uribe’s government has maintained on-off peace negotiations with the ELN via meetings in Havana or contact through an intermediary in Colombia. To date these talks have made little progress and the most recent round has been characterised by misaligned priorities and objectives. Negotiations with FARC have been non-existent, and despite various military successes against FARC that have pushed them back to remote areas, the guerrillas continue to control large areas of the countryside. Efforts by third parties to broker a humanitarian exchange of prisoners and hostages with the FARC have not borne fruit. Even if it is possible to reintegrate the demobilized paramilitaries into society without returning to violence, it is unlikely that a successful peace deal can be brokered with either FARC or the ELN during Uribe’s presidency.

by Miriam Bradley

▲Top▲

Latest Update from CrisisWatch (September 2007)

Little movement on FARC-government hostage swap: FARC rejected President Uribe’s offer for 90-day “zone of encounter” to follow FARC hostage release and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s offer of exchange in Venezuela. Chavez-Uribe meeting 31 August decided Chavez to invite FARC for negotiations in Venezuela; rebels yet to respond. UN said 500 displaced by fighting in Narino province over border with Ecuador. No agreement reached in new round of ELN-government talks in Havana 20-25 August.

Published at the beginning of each calendar month, CrisisWatch is produced by the International Crisis Group.

▲Top▲

Resources, Links and References

Insight on Conflict is not responsible for the content of external internet sites

ABColombia - News, documents, analysis, and commentary relating to the Colombian conflict, in English and Spanish

Accord Colombia Project - Publication on peace-building in Colombia

Actualidad Colombiana - News, analysis, and information on the Colombian conflict, in Spanish

Amnesty International - Reports and documents on humanitarian issues in Colombia

BBC: Colombia - Country profile on Colombia

Cambio - Colombian news site, in Spanish

Colombia Human Rights Network - News and background to Colombian conflict, in English and Spanish

Colombia Libre - Official website of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), in Spanish

Colombia Support Network - Background information, news, and literature relating to the Colombian conflict

Conflict Analysis Resource Centre (CERAC) - Research, analysis, and publications relating to Colombia’s civil conflict, in Spanish and English

Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia - Official website of the Colombian ombudsman, containing reports and publications relating to the general state of human rights in Colombia, in Spanish

Derechos Colombia - Links to organisations, reports, and articles relating to human rights issues in Colombia

Economist: Colombia - Country briefing on Colombia by The Economist magazine

Ethnologue - A guide to the languages and ethnicities of Colombia

Government of Colombia - Government information on Colombian political and social issues, in Spanish

Human Rights Watch - Articles and publications relating to human rights in Colombia

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre - Comprehensive overview of the Colombian conflict, including the latest figures on IDPs

International Alert - Background information and projects run by IA in Colombia

International Crisis Group - A comprehensive resource for information on the conflict in Colombia

National Liberation Army (ELN) - Official website, in Spanish

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Reports on humanitarian issues in Colombia, in English and Spanish

Peace Brigades International - Latest news and reports, plus details of PBI’s projects in Colombia

Political Resources - Provides links to political parties and organisations operating in Colombia, in Spanish

ReliefWeb - A leading online gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - Official website, in Spanish

Semana - Colombian news site, in Spanish

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) - News, background information, analysis, and policy documents relating to Colombia’s internally displaced population

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) - Overview and documents relating to the Colombian conflict, with particular emphasis on the impact of the conflict on women

University of Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Detailed overview and commentary on Colombian conflict

▲Top▲

Share This

Introduction

The current conflict in the Niger Delta is driven by oil politics. Low intensity ethnic conflicts on a local scale have always been part of life in the Niger Delta. However, the vast wealth available to those who control the power structures of the state and the increasing polarisation of society has led to a significant shift in the underlying conflict dynamic. This struggle for political power and access to resources has often resulted in conflict. Oil companies have been charged with increasing this conflict dynamic by favouring host communities over others and making direct payments to the most troublesome elements in society to maintain the short-term peace. The failure by all stakeholders to address the underlying causes of the conflict and opt for short-term solutions has pushed the Niger Delta to the brink of an internationally important conflict.

Background to the conflict

The peaceful clamour for change and justice for the population of the Niger Delta was led throughout the 1990s by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Headed by Ken Saro-Wiwa, their struggle received international attention and when Ken Saro-Wiwa was hanged, on 10th November 1995, with eight other Ogoni activists, the world responded with collective condemnation. This peaceful action for change continues to date in the Niger Delta but is perceived by many as having failed to deliver, and therefore violence is a more attractive and acceptable option for many of today’s disengaged youth.

During the 1990s there were low intensity ethnic and community conflicts in the Niger Delta. The first real heightening of the conflict dynamic occurred in Warri in 1997 and continued on and off until 2003. This tri-ethnic conflict cost thousands of lives, immense human suffering and extensive loss to material investment. It laid the foundation for many of the militant groups that now dominate the general perception of the conflict in the Niger Delta.

The use of political thugs to secure the 2003 election resulted in the rise of the first seriously recognised militia group calling for substantive restructuring of the Niger Delta soci